Enclosure 1

EUNAVFOR MED OPERATION SOPHIA SIX MONTHLY REPORT

REPORTING PERIOD: 1 JUNE 2017 – 30 NOVEMBER 2017

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA (ENFM) is continuing to contribute to wider EU efforts for the return of stability in Libya, in cooperation with international and national actors. ENFM is the first EU maritime force in the Central Mediterranean and is playing a key role as a maritime security provider in an area of strategic interest to the EU. The Operation is delivering positive effects at sea and from the sea, including through the training provided to the Libyan Navy and Coastguard, and its presence constitutes an internationally recognised deterrent effect.

By the end of June, 2017 had seen the highest number of migrants smuggled on the Central Mediterranean Route to Europe. However, from July onward a significant drop in the migration flow was observed, which lasted until the end of the reporting period. This is due to a number of factors, including an increase in the capability of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard, changes in the local dynamics and periods of fighting between rival groups in Sabratha, which used to be one of the main departure points. EU and Member States’ bilateral efforts in the countries of origin and transit have also contributed to reducing the flow of irregular migrants.

Although the Libyan Coastguard is still far from being fully operational, they have undeniably played a more proactive role in the reporting period. In 2017, the Libyan Coastguard saved almost 20,000 lives, which is a marked increase compared to the previous years (800 lives saved in 2015). At the same time, the number of deaths at sea has decreased.

During the reporting period, ENFM continued to actively disrupt the migrant smugglers and human traffickers’ business model through apprehending persons suspected of such

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5 As stated in the Annex A to the EUMC Military Advice (EEAS(2017) 1122 REV 3 dated 28 September 2017): “2. Mission ... by combining these operations with surveillance within the AO, and information sharing on broader illicit trafficking and illegal exports that are contrary to UNSCR 2146 (2014) and UNSCR 2362 (2017). Operation SOPHIA enhances situational awareness and maritime security in the Central Mediterranean in line with the MSO concept.”
crimes, disposing of boats and engines used for these illicit activities and the collection of data and information related to trafficking and smuggling. In the upcoming months, ENFM will focus its efforts on better understanding the activity ashore in the areas of departure to enhance the Operation’s ability to better predict how smugglers will adapt to the changing situation on the ground. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) assets, when available, should improve the picture and contribute to a more effective assessment.

The Operation continued to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2357(2017) that was renewed in June 2017. The results achieved by ENFM in the last six months have delivered an internationally recognised deterrent effect in international waters.

ENFM training of the Libyan Coastguard and Navy, which commenced in October 2016, continued to progress well in the reporting period. The general assessment is positive; trainees have been motivated and eager to expand their knowledge. The importance of the training was also recognised on different occasions by Libyan civilian and military authorities.

Recent events at sea involving the Libyan Navy and Coastguard highlight the need for continued training, with the Libyan Coastguard Commander showing a strong personal commitment to the training. A problem linked to the payment of salaries, which emerged in October during the last training module provided in Italy, remains a national Libyan issue for which a solution might be found thanks also to the personal commitment of the Head of the EU Delegation to Libya.

During the reporting period, 68 Libyan personnel were trained in Rome and in Taranto (Italy). Since the beginning, ENFM has delivered 201 certificates to 188 Libyan personnel upon successful completion of training. The selection of a further 150 candidates by the Libyan authorities for the next training packages planned for Spain, Greece and Italy in early 2018 is expected soon. Minor changes have also been introduced to improve the vetting process.

Through the training, ENFM has established an excellent relationship with the Libyan Navy and Coastguard based on reciprocal trust. As a result, the Libyan Navy and Coastguard have been receptive of the feedback and recommendations provided by ENFM during training and initial monitoring activities.

With the extension of the mandate new tasks were added to the Operation: monitoring the Libyan Navy and Coastguard, gathering information on oil smuggling and enhancing information sharing. Recent events at sea involving the Libyan Coastguard have confirmed the need to put in place an effective monitoring mechanism. While the information flow provided by the Libyan Coastguard is slightly improving this activity needs to be supported with:

- assets capable of monitoring the activity of Libyan Patrol Boats at sea (UAVs);
- video-recording systems provided to the Libyan Navy and Coastguard Patrol Boats in order to collect information for “after action” reports;
- a more continuous presence in the Libyan Operations Room that would enhance ENFM’s ability to observe and evaluate on duty behaviour of Libyan personnel and how they conduct and coordinate their institutional tasks.

As regards gathering of information on oil smuggling, the Operation is starting to develop a deeper understanding of how oil smugglers operate. Information collected is shared on a permanent basis with relevant agencies.

ENFM will also continue to enhance information exchange with all relevant EU, international and national law enforcement agencies, including the European Border and Coastguard Agency FRONTEX and EUROPOL, along with the Italian “Direzione Nazionale Antimafia ed Antiterrorismo” and Italian prosecutors who are playing an important role in disrupting the smuggling business model. Additionally, the Operation remains ready to host the Crime Information Cell at sea.

Meanwhile, the Operation’s outreach activities have been aimed at strengthening the already existing good relationship between ENFM and different national, international, non-governmental, civil and military organisations and broadening the network of ENFM’s partners.
MIGRATION ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN

During the reporting period irregular migration across the Mediterranean continued on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR, North Africa to Malta and Italy), the Western Mediterranean Route (WMR, from North West Africa to Spain) and the Eastern Mediterranean Route (EMR, from Turkey to Greece) as depicted in table 1.

The CMR continues to be the predominant route, with 53,246 migrants smuggled during the reporting period (112,425 since the beginning of the year). However, the number of irregular migrants using the CMR decreased significantly when compared both with the previous reporting period and with the same period in 2016.² Of the 53,246 irregular migrants travelling in the CMR during the reporting period, 76% were male, 11.5% female and 12.5% minors. The drop in arrivals, compared to 78,392 during the previous reporting period, can be seen as a result of various circumstances. Under pressure from the international community to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking, Libyan authorities increased their efforts to address the irregular flow of migrants. The Libyan Navy and Coastguard (LNCG) significantly increased their presence at sea, acted effectively in safety of life at sea (SOLAS) events and rescued around 11,000 migrants at sea in the reporting period (almost 20,000 since the beginning of the year).

The makeup of the migrant flow was dominated by individuals from Western and Central Africa comprising 84% of all migrants on the CMR. Nigeria continues to be the main country of origin (15%), followed by Tunisia (10%), Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast and Sudan (each 7%). The number of migrants from Bangladesh decreased from 8% in the previous reporting period to 3.3%. The number of irregular migrants coming from Tunisia increased significantly with 656% compared to the previous reporting period.

Although not part of ENFM’s mandate, during the reporting period the Operation was directly involved in 41 SOLAS events, with ENFM units rescuing a total of 5,542 migrants (287 SOLAS events and 42,147 rescued migrants since the beginning of the Operation) that represents 10% of the total number of migrants rescued in the Central Mediterranean. This average remains unchanged since the beginning of the Operation.

NGO ships continued to operate in the area off the coast of Western Libya during the reporting period. In June, there were approximately nine vessels operating at any one time, often close to Libyan Territorial Waters. However from July onward, many NGOs withdrew their vessels, in part linked to the requirement to sign the Code of Conduct issued by the Italian Government. From August onward there were on average four vessels operating at any one time. Of those organisations that continue to operate, all

² From July to October, CMR departures fell by 60%, 81%, 55% and 78% when compared to 2016 (see table 2, Migration Flow on the Central Mediterranean Route).
have now signed the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the NGOs now appear to operate further out in international waters than previously.

Migration Flow 2017
01 Jun – 30 Nov 2017

Table 1
Migration Flow, Mediterranean Sea (1 June – 30 November 2017)
**SMUGGLING BUSINESS MODEL**

At the start of the reporting period it appeared that 2017 was going to see a greater number of irregular migrants smuggled or trafficked on the CMR compared to previous years. All assessments at this point projected that migrant numbers would continue to increase and overtake the previous highest annual total of 2016.

The month of June saw approximately 23,000 people crossing the Mediterranean. However, starting in July there was a significant drop in migrant arrivals, confirmed in the following months. A number of factors contributed to this decrease, including an increase in the capability of the LNCG, alongside local arrangements and an intense period of fighting in Sabratha (which had accounted for 70% of all departures from Libya in 2017 until that point). Based on the data observed between July and November, it is now likely that 2017 will see the lowest number of migrants since pre-2014 (see table 2).

Wider EU and Member States' efforts, including EU cooperation with authorities in Niger against migrant smuggling, appear to have reduced the numbers of irregular migrants...
entering into Libya. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has acknowledged that, in the first six months of 2016, some 5,000 – 7,000 migrants were transiting per week into Algeria or Libya. In October 2017, the IOM numbers showed a decrease to 5,500 migrants per month. These above factors together will have an increasing impact on the smugglers business model (SBM) going forward as the capability of the LNCG continues to increase and EU efforts continue.

However, there appears to have been no significant changes in the long established sub-Saharan smuggling routes used, which pass through Sabha in the southwest emanating from hubs in Tamanrasset in Algeria and Agadez in Niger through to the northern coast of western Libya. AQIM and Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslim (JNIM) are assessed to be financially exploiting these smuggling routes, together with various Tuareg tribes. The same north-south pattern is present in eastern Libya, generally passing through Khartoum and Dongola in Sudan and then on to Kufrah in south-eastern Libya. Along this route the Tebu tribe appears to be the main financial beneficiary. Reports from the European Border and Coastguard Agency (FRONTEX) suggest that sexually motivated harassment and exploitation of female migrants continues to take place along the various routes.

On the CMR, the vast majority of SOLAS events (696) continue to take place in the waters off the coast of Libya between the ports of Zuwarah and Sabratha. During the reporting period, 82% of launches have taken place from a smaller stretch of the Libyan coastline between Zawiya and Sabratha, west of Tripoli. Since mid-September, following the clashes in Sabratha, there has been an increase in launches East of Tripoli (mainly from Al Khums and Gasr Garabulli areas).

**Smugglers Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)**

There has been a significant evolution in the SBM during the reporting period. June saw smugglers continue to use coordinated mass launches with a large number of vessels launched in convoy. However, by July this had all but stopped and there was a return to single launches from the departure points.

In the last six months, both rubber and wooden boats continued to be used, although a decrease in the number of migrants per boat has been observed, compared to the previous reporting period. Although in the past attempts to produce rubber boats locally were observed, during the last six months smugglers used only imported rubber boats. There are low quality-low price vessels which have a greater chance of sinking than other vessels. They are not constructed to withstand the wear and tear of multiple use, although this does not stop the smugglers seeking to reuse them where possible. Locally constructed purpose-built wooden boats continue to be used as an alternative to rubber boats as, although of limited seaworthiness, they are more robust craft than the rubber alternative. A very small number of fishing vessels were used in the past, while during the last six months none of them were observed. In the late summer 2017, the Operation observed the use of fast boats in fiberglass to quickly carry small groups of migrants of North African or Middle Eastern descent out of Libyan territorial waters, possibly to avoid contact with the LNCG.
The majority of sub-Saharan migrants rescued in this reporting period appear to have been living in Libya for more than six months, although the waiting time can vary from just a few days to several months. Reports issued by IOM and FRONTEX indicate that different nationalities are charged different rates for their journey to Europe. Reports also indicate that the average fee, paid per person, in the reporting period for a Sub-Saharan migrant crossing the Mediterranean is approximately €820. This price is solely for a space on a rubber boat, which appears to be only used by Sub-Saharan migrants. This appears to represent an increase of approximately €100 in the average cost of a crossing, compared to the previous reporting period. The journey on the more seaworthy wooden boat, according to reports, is twice as much. Reports showed that migrants from North Africa or Middle East would pay significantly more for the same journey.

**Weapons smuggling**

The majority of ammunition and weapons used by the various actors in Libya are still from the Gaddafi-era weapons inventory. Although an intra-theatre arms transfer is believed to occur inside the Libyan Territorial Waters, there is little intelligence suggesting any inter-theatre transfers and, since the last boarding on 19 June when ENFM seized weapons on board the MV EL MUKTHAR, the Operation has not detected any weapons smuggling activity carried out in international waters.

**Oil smuggling**

ENFM has tracked suspected oil tankers leaving Libya with smuggled oil headed towards areas outside Libyan territorial waters, where oil tankers conduct ship to ship transfers to smaller vessels which then disperse to third harbours (including to EU Member States harbours). The Operation suspects that the other smaller vessels have large cisterns or tanks hidden under a canopy of even hull. They transit into Libyan territorial waters posing as fisherman to pick up smuggled fuel for onward transit.

**LNCG role**

During the reporting period the Libyan authorities and Coastguard have been highly active in trying to stop illicit activities in their territorial waters with a particular focus on oil smuggling, seizing a number of vessels which allegedly were involved in oil smuggling. This is helping to counter an illicit activity that has become rampant in the western parts of the country. Thanks to the fruitful relationship established with the LNCG it has been possible to receive timely information on illicit activities such as, on 15 August, a list of vessels "chartered" by the Libyan authorities.
OPERATIONAL UPDATES

Today, 27 Member States are contributing to the Operation with assets, personnel and additional voluntary financial contributions.

Manning

The OHQ is composed of 180 positions and 10 positions of OHQ Liaison Staff. As on 30 November, the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) is manned at 85% by 162 staff members of whom 100 are from the host nation (Italy) and 62 from other Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). At the end of November, the Operation welcomed the first officer from Ireland in the OHQ. The Operation has Liaison Officers deployed in the EEAS, including in the EU Military Staff, as well as in Frontex, UNSMIL and EUROPOL. There are also personnel from ENFM in the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), and NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM).

The standing FHQ CE requirement is for 82 positions; however this has been temporarily reduced to 46 posts because of the space available on the current Flagship. The Force Headquarters (FHQ), which was deployed since 31 August 2017 on board the Flagship CANTABRIA (ES), is currently manned at 94% by 43 staff members. Of them, 14 are from Spain and 29 have been deployed by 14 other Member States (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom). The total number of personnel in the Operational Force, including the ships’ crews, air detachments and logistical elements, has reached a medium average of 1100 units (354 from the host nation and 807 multinational).

There are still various manning challenges, not least the fact that a number of key posts remain vacant. These posts are predominantly manning positions (currently DACOS CJ1, DACOS CJMed, however, in the coming months the OHQ expect vacancies in the posts of ACOS CJ1, ACOS CJMed and DACOS CJ6 in the OHQ).

Furthermore, ENFM faces frequent personnel rotations that make it more difficult to carry out the activities. Therefore longer tour lengths, of at least 6 months, and even longer for key positions such as ACOS and specialists, would greatly benefit the Operation.

Asset Flow

During the reporting period, the force received direct support from a total of 14 ships with an average of four to five ships assigned to the force\(^3\). In total, 9 nations have contributed with surface, sub surface and air assets during the reporting period (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). These were deployed throughout the Area of Operations with airborne surveillance present across the southern end of the Lampedusa triangle providing real time queuing for surface

\(^3\)Flagships ITS SAN GIUSTO (until 31 Aug) followed by ESPO CANTABRIA: FSs, BLAISON, L’ADROIT, DUCUING and PREMIER-MAITRE L’HER; ESPO VICTORIA, HMS ECHO, FSs RHEIN and MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN and L’ NIAMH.
units who were tasked to spot escorts or jackals, particularly during dawn hours when most launches from Libya are undertaken.

In addition, air operations continue with the employment of shore based Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) from Portugal (one aircraft), Spain (one aircraft), Luxembourg (two aircrafts) and one French MPA that provides a non-permanent contribution. Two on-board medium helicopters were embarked in ENFM naval assets.

The Operation continues to suffer from a significant under resourcing of assets. In general, ENFM only has approximately one third of the approved naval and air assets required, as set out in the CJSOR approved by the PSC. Among the critical capabilities necessary to properly fulfill the mandate it is worthwhile to underline:

- a permanent presence of a capable Flagship that allows the Force Commander to exercise the Tactical Command at sea of the assigned naval, air and sub assets;
- an ISR capability (such UAVs) that can ensure effective data gathering better suited to support core and supporting tasks;
- a ROLE 2 capability on board that could allow an increased freedom of movement of assets at sea (including the possibility to carry out opposed boarding when this capacity is available).

Some progress was made on 22 November with the Athena Special Committee agreement on common funding of UAV capability (subject to an initial assessment after 240 hours of operation). 120 flying hours per month have been requested by ENFM to properly implement the assigned tasks. At the 8th Global Force Generation Conference, on 23 November, Italy offered the UAV assets as well as a Flagship to take over from ESPS CANTABRIA starting from 14 December.

**DELIVERY AGAINST TASKS**

**Disrupting the Smugglers Business Model**

The Operation continued to focus efforts on identifying and apprehending persons suspected of participating in migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya to Europe. During the reporting period, ENFM activities contributed to the apprehension of 18 persons suspected of smuggling and trafficking crimes by Italian authorities, bringing the total number of facilitators arrested due to ENFM activity to 127. ENFM contributed towards disrupting the smugglers networks through collecting, analysing and sharing information with relevant agencies, including FRONTEX and EUROPOL. During the reporting period ENFM assets also disposed of 69 boats (57 RB, 11WB and 1 FG)\(^4\) which had been used for migrant smuggling/human trafficking and would otherwise been used again by smugglers. The total number of boats neutralised by ENFM assets is 511 since the start of the Operation.

\(^4\) RB: Rubber boat, WB: Wooden boat and FG: Fiber glass
Training the Libyan Navy and Coastguard

Since training started in October 2016, ENFM has delivered certificates of attendance to 201 Libyan trainees upon completion of the training programme.

During the last six months, the training of personnel from the LNCG continued to progress well. In July, ENFM provided a Service-oriented infrastructure for MARitime Traffic tracking (SMART) system course for three Libyan Coastguard trainees to support information exchange. In September, two further modules of "Training Package 2" were delivered in Italian Navy training facilities in Taranto. Patrol Boat Crew Training for 59 individuals was held between 25 September and 17 November. EU Agencies, International Organisations and NGOs (FRONTEX, EASO, IOM, UNHCR, CISOM, the RAVA Foundation), as well as training teams from Italy, UK and Germany delivered lectures on various topics including human rights, assistance to vulnerable categories and first aid. An additional Trainers' Training course was conducted from 19 September until 6 October for six Officers and Petty Officers who had previously attended Training Package 1. Three Libyan tutors supervised the training activities on behalf of the Libyan Authorities.

The quality of the trainees, as for the previous training modules, has been good and they have displayed an eagerness to learn and develop their skills.

Based on the lessons learned during the previous training modules, Member States authorised the payment of a "per diem" to mitigate economic difficulties experienced by the trainees during the training period. Nevertheless, this measure was not complemented by national Libyan actions aimed at providing salaries in due time and the problem was again raised by the trainees during the last training package. The issue required an immediate and firm involvement of OPCDR and the Head of EUDEL Libya and, thanks to the latter's personal engagement with the Libyan military and civilian authorities at national level, the problem was eventually solved.

The vetting support provided by national, international and EU agencies has been valuable. The feedback provided by one MS after the start of the training module in Taranto raised some initial concerns among the Libyan Coastguard. After the necessary verifications and the involvement of all relevant parties (LNCG, EEAS, EUDEL Libya, Libyan national authorities) 18 trainees were repatriated. As a lesson learned, the duration of the vetting has been slightly prolonged.

In line with the MoU on training signed by the OPCDR and the LNCG on 23 August 2016, planning is now underway for future training packages (tentatively planned for early 2018) for Libyan Navy and Coastguard personnel: 30 trainees are due to participate in Crete (Greece), 36 trainees in Cartagena (Spain) and 85 trainees in Italy.

The involvement of Libyan Navy personnel in ENFM training is specified in the MoU. It is worth recalling that:
- MS agreed to leave to the Libyans the authority to select their candidates for training;
the Libyan Coastguard is part of the Libyan Navy. In terms of military employment, the present situation in Libya allows the Navy HQ a certain degree of flexibility. Therefore Navy personnel can easily be "transferred" to the Coastguard function;
- in the last months, thanks to Italian maintenance support provided on bilateral basis, the Libyan Navy is returning at sea and is carrying out "constabulary operations" (including search and rescue operations).
Therefore, there is also a need to train the Libyan Navy personnel.

The last envisaged training package (TP3) that is to be delivered on board LNCG vessels will be conducted only when ENFM will be authorised to enter into Phase 2B (in the Libyan Territorial Waters). The training needs to be synchronised with the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) project carried out by the Italian Coast Guard (FOC of Libyan MRCC estimated in 2020).

Concerning the financial aspects, 2.6 Million € have been provided on a voluntary basis by MS for the training task, with 24% of these funds spent so far. The remaining funds are assessed to be sufficient to cover the planned expenses for training up to 500 people. A relevant part of the costs relates to travel expenses (from/to Libya). In order to limit the expenses, the Operation is looking for MS contributions in terms of flight hours, as envisaged in the ATARES (Air Transport & Air to Air Refuelling and other Exchange of Services) arrangement through the MCCE (Movement Coordination Centre Europe) and in the EATC framework.

The training has been an excellent tool to strengthen the relationship with the LNCG, improve confidence building and enhance the exchange of information (such as in the case of weapon's seizure on board of the MV EL MUKTHAR or on 3 September, when OPCDR received an information from the Libyan Coastguard concerning four people, allegedly Yemeni nationals suspected of being involved in serious crimes, who were trying to leave Libya by boat in the attempt to escape arrest). As a result of this excellent relationship, the LNCG has been receptive of the feedback and recommendations provided by ENFM during training and initial monitoring activities. For example, this was the case in the meetings between OPCDR and the LNCG after events that took place on 1 and 6 November involving LNCG patrol boats, where the latter promised to set up a lessons learned process.
Countering Illegal Arms Trafficking (CIAT)

ENFM continues to be the only operation that is implementing UNSCR 2357 (2017). The presence of the Operation in the area has achieved an internationally recognised deterrent effect against arms smugglers in international waters. During the last six months, a total of 431 hailings, 26 friendly approaches and one inspection were carried out by the Operation. Since the start of the task, the Operation has conducted 978 hailings, 74 friendly approaches, 7 flag enquiries and 3 inspections.

A lack of capable ISR assets such as UAV assets reduce the Operation’s capacity to build up a clear maritime picture. Despite the lack of actionable maritime intelligence on individual vessel and cargo movements assessed to be on route towards the Area of Operations, initial intelligence about the existence of an intra-theatre route between Misrata and Benghazi led OPCDR to decide to maintain a permanent asset in the Gulf of Sirte and in front of Tobruk. This resulted in two inspections and subsequent seizures carried out by ENFM: the first during the previous reporting period on 1 May on board MV EL MUKTHAR while the second on 19 June again on MV EL MUKTHAR. On the first occasion, the seized arms, currently stored in an Italian Navy depot in Sicily under custody of Italian judicial authorities, were inspected by the UN Panel of Experts in September 2017. The Committee was satisfied with the procedure adopted by ENFM to dealing with seized arms. On the latter occasion, the weapons (a small amount consisting in five AK-47s, two machine guns and a limited quantity of ammunitions) were disposed of at sea.

ENFM has limited capabilities for conducting CIAT activities. Naval assets allocated to the task should have on board specialist teams (including Arabic interpreters and search dogs) fully trained in all boarding techniques and procedures. However, ENFM naval assets are currently capable of unopposed boardings only. This, combined with the unavailability of a Medical Role 2 facility, reduces the Operation’s ability to conduct the CIAT task (although Poland has recently offered an opposed boarding team). The need for Member States to fill these gaps has been highlighted in periodic Force Generation Conferences.

Exercises have been conducted by the OHQ, the FHQ and ENFM units at sea during the reporting period. These exercises have focused on practicing Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), including ROE, the process for obtaining Flag State Consent, the practical execution of boardings and inspections and the preparation of the related reports. The consequent lessons learned have allowed the staff to improve their readiness to tackle such events in future, should circumstances change.

Due to the distance from the CIAT mission area to Marseille, the only officially designated Port of Diversion, the operation faces challenges that have not been fully resolved. The Athena Committee, having looked into the financial aspects related to CIAT, determined that only the costs associated with the transportation of diverted vessels can be financed from common funds, excluding for the time being the remaining costs related to the stay at the port of diversion or to the storage and disposal of the seized weapons and ammunition. A decision on the financial and legal implications related to the seizing of weapons during CIAT operations is still pending at political level. Therefore, at present, in case weapons
are found, ENFM will transfer such material to a willing Member State for storage and disposal. In case this option is not possible, ENFM will dispose of such material at sea, provided that this causes no harm to the marine environment or to the safety of navigation.

**Gathering Information on illegal traffic, including crude oil Smuggling**

EU Council Decision 1385/2017 requires ENFM to conduct surveillance activities and gather information on illegal trafficking, including information on crude oil and other illegal exports that are contrary to UNSCR 2146 (2014) and UNSCR 2362 (2017), thereby contributing to situational awareness and to maritime security in the Central Mediterranean. In this regard, the Operation has developed a good understanding of how oil smugglers operate through the observations of the “patterns of life” of suspected vessels. To that end, ENFM assets have been deployed in a dynamic manner that increasingly includes patrolling areas where suspected illegal oil trafficking activity occurs. They are tasked to identify possible oil smuggling using their on board surveillance systems. Suspicious vessels are tracked also via the FRONTEX JORA (Joint Operation Reporting Application) system. Moreover, the Operation has also instructed assets in Direct and Associated Support to gather information and collect imagery about oil smuggling and to track and report on oil tanker activity.

The main areas of concern for oil smuggling and illicit activities are around the vicinity of the Gulf of Sirte and to the north of Zawiyah. As LNCG capacity has increased, they have focused more on counter-smuggling and it is likely that ongoing action by Libyan authorities has resulted in the smugglers’ adapting their operating patterns, including changing routes to markets.

During a meeting with Libyan Prime Minister Serraj, he requested that ENFM’s task should not be limited to gathering and exchanging information on the oil embargo, but also to act upon such information. This was conveyed to the Chairman of the EU Military Committee by letter on 11 October 2017.

**Monitoring**

Following the signature of an additional annex to the existing MoU on training of the LNCG on 21 August 2017, ENFM has developed and begun to implement a monitoring mechanism. This is achieved via ‘information collection’ through daily reports from the LNCG Operations Room, ‘remote monitoring’ by ENFM, and single day ‘periodic meetings’ between ENFM and LNCG representatives. In particular:

- **Information Collection:** reporting performed by the Libyan Coastguard Operations Room needs to be further improved in terms of content and timing. To mitigate these shortfalls, ENFM OHQ is constantly engaging the LNCG Operations Room to support a continuous flow of the required information.
- **Remote Monitoring:** Remote Monitoring by ENFM contributes to verifying the overall effectiveness of LNCG operational activity at sea. The performance of LNCG personnel is also monitored with special focus on those trained by ENFM. Remote monitoring
would be greatly enhanced by an augmented persistence of air assets in the Area of Operation with more performing ISR sensors. In the future, Member States’ commitment to ensure common funding for UAV assets (120 hours/month) – if confirmed - will ease this issue.

- Periodic Meetings: the first single day periodic meeting took place in Tripoli on 26 September 2017 under EUDEL Libya’s organisation and security framework. Later, three further meetings have been organised on 2, 6 and 13 November, while on 15 November OPCDR met the Libyan Coastguard Commander. However, the frequency of periodic meetings is limited and depends on EUBAM Libya and EUDEL Libya availability to provide the necessary logistic and security support. The effectiveness of this activity is severely impaired by limitations in the duration of the visits as dictated by MS during the approval phase of OPLAN 5.0.

At present, the Operation is relying on reporting from LNCG, the limited information collected by the ENFM assets (given that ships, if near Libyan Territorial Waters, are readily tasked for search and rescue and MPA assets do not have a persistent surveillance capability). With the support of EUDEL Libya and EUBAM Libya, today ENFM can assess the Libyan performance in their Operations Room for 4-5 hours per day, a few days per month. In this way, it is only possible to collect partial information, which will not allow a complete and exhaustive assessment on the level of effectiveness and professionalism achieved by the LNCG. Due to the above mentioned challenges, a clear picture of LNCG’s capability will require time to properly address the current shortfalls. A first report on monitoring will be submitted to the Member States in February 2018.

Information sharing

Exchange of information with other actors remains a key part of the Operation’s mandate. It continues on a regular basis, with the purpose of improving situational awareness on the smuggling activities of interest (migration, oil and weapons). The already close cooperation with FRONTEX and EUROPOL has been further enhanced, with regular meetings/VTCs, permanent ENFM Liaison Officers and with a careful review of the classification levels of the Operation’s products (marking the documents “law enforcement sensitive” whenever possible, thus allowing a better sharing of information). Collaboration with FRONTEX was strengthened through the deployment of the agency’s VTC device in OHQ allowing the exchange of sensitive information and assessments in bi-weekly VTCs.

EUROPOL has recently upgraded ENFM from strategic to operational third party in the SIENA system. SIENA’s architecture needs to be further improved: the system today allows uploading intelligence products from OHQ and FHQ (such as monthly intelligence reports, vessels of interest lists etc.) but does not allow downloading EUROPOL intelligence products.

ENFM also updated its migrant interview questionnaires to get more targeted information, which are shared with EUROPOL, and is contributing with one staff member to

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5 Only two other meetings are planned in Tripoli until the end of the year.
EUROPOL’s Information Clearing House. Different classified means of communication are used depending on the counterpart’s capabilities: ENFM Classified Mission Network (CMN), the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES), “ACID” software, SIENA and JORA networks. Further work is ongoing in order to assess the feasibility to set-up ENFM’s classified mission network terminals in FRONTEX and EUROPOL HQs. This solution should further ease the exchange of high classification intelligence products.

NATO cooperation remains relevant. In line with the administrative arrangement on cooperation between Op Sea Guardian and ENFM that was signed by OPCDR and the Allied Maritime Commander (COM MARCOM) in May 2017, the Operations exchange information (such as daily situation reports, lists of vessels of interest and intelligence reports) relevant for the fulfilment of the respective mandates.

The Service Oriented Infrastructure for Maritime Traffic tracking (SMART) platform, provided by the Italian Navy to ENFM, is designed to enable unclassified information sharing between ENFM, other operations/agencies (such as NATO and FRONTEX), Operation Rooms ashore (such as the Commander in Chief of the Italian Naval Fleet, Tunis and Tripoli) as well as maritime shipping companies. With the shipping industry a fruitful discussion is ongoing in order to improve voluntary exchange of information with merchant vessels sailing in the Area of Operation.

Crime Information Cell

ENFM has been identified to host a pilot project aimed at enhancing CSDP-JHA cooperation. The Operation is ready to host the Crime Information Cell on board of one of its warships. Having a Crime Information Cell afloat will enable increasing timely sharing of relevant information to JHA Agencies in order to identify, prevent and disrupt criminal activity within Member States. Furthermore, a warship can operate close to the Territorial Waters of a Third Country while remaining in International Waters allowing the Crime Information Cell to be present in the area of operational interest without entering the territory. Moreover, warships are self-sustainable and capable of operating at sea for long periods in all weather conditions (in contrast to other types and smaller naval assets). ENFM naval assets can provide a Crime Information Cell with logistic support, dedicated working spaces (fully compliant with safety and security regulations) and real time satellite communications (voice and data). Last but not least, warships can ensure self-defence in any situation from any threat.
SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Intelligence

Accurate, timely and robust intelligence support continues to be one of the critical requirements for ENFM to succeed in its main and supporting tasks. In the last six months, ENFM increased the production of intelligence reports in particular with regards to the additional task of gathering information on illicit oil smuggling. ENFM has produced a Vessel of Interest list (VOI List) containing roughly 300 vessels that are possibly involved in illicit activities in the AOO. This list is compiled by merging information coming from FHQ assets operating in the AOO, MS military sources, NATO sources and information from law enforcement agencies. ENFM also produces weekly and monthly Intelligence Summaries (INTSUM), Intelligence Reports and Special Reports. In addition to routine reporting, during the reporting period the OHQ produced 12 INTREPs, 9 SPECREPs and 5 SECREPs. 30 Requests For Information (RFIs) were submitted and 14 replies received. Most of the responses were provided by EU Member States, but the Operation also exchanged products with NATO/MARCOM, FRONTEX, EUROPOL and the US. EU SATCEN also provided 13 products in response to requests from ENFM related to the core task, the arms embargo and oil smuggling. All products were provided in the requested time and the analysis has increased ENFM's situational awareness. There is currently no direct exchange of information with the US and all documents are exchanged via the EEAS in Brussels.

Communication and Information System (CIS)

The CIS architecture at OHQ and FHQ level is well organised with the support of Italy as host nation.

This reporting period saw the operational requirement to extend the Classified Mission Network (CMN) to the Spanish CHOD/JOC in Madrid, as well as to the Portuguese COMNAV in Lisbon. A feasibility study for further extensions to EUROPOL and FRONTEX for the sharing of mission specific data is under way and is due to be completed shortly after site surveys and follow up evaluations. In parallel with the extension, the CMN policy has also been revised to ensure the security of the network.

Logistic Support

ENFM is well sustained by the established logistics infrastructure in the region. The Forward Logistic Base (FLB) in IT Naval Base Augusta, the Forward Logistic Site (FLS) in IT Air Base Pantelleria and the Forward Operating Base (FOB) in IT Air Base Sigonella all effectively support the operation. The FLB, FLS and FOB are situated within the JOA and are included in ENFM's Command and Control (C2) architecture. The FLB and FOB constitute the main operational logistics hubs for the operation. Greece provides additional logistic sites at the FLS Souda and FOB Souda, both in Crete.

In the beginning of the reporting period, the lack of an Auxiliary Oiler affected the operational tempo for the naval assets deployed in the AOO. However, the situation
improved on 1 September 2017 when the supply ship ESPS CANTABRIA (capable of conducting replenishment at sea) joined the operation as flagship.

Moreover, the arrangement between NATO MARCOM and ENFM on 30 May 2017 established the framework of mutual logistic support between ENFM and NATO Operation Sea Guardian, including replenishment at sea.

**Medical Support**

Since 2016 the afloat medical support to ENFM still lacks a Role 2 Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) that is currently provided by a Role 1 on each vessel. The Role 1 MTF on ITS SAN GIUSTO was replaced from 31 August 2017 by the Role 1 MTF on ESPS CANTABRIA. Due to a lack of a surgical team, in particular anaesthesiology capabilities, it could not serve as a Role 2 MTF, despite the suitable medical infrastructure. Whilst these capabilities were present on board of the MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN, the infrastructure on board of this ship did not allow it to be considered having a Role 2 capability. The medical situation results in an increased medical risk with a limited capacity to meet the recommended medical support timelines for damage control surgery.

A mitigation risk assessment is conducted in the planning and execution phases of the operational activities, taking into consideration the position of assets with on board helicopters and the position of ashore facilities. In particular, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is available via organic rotary assets in ESPS CANTABRIA and ITS ZEFFIRO. In situations where it is not possible to follow the 10-1-2 rule, units reduce the distance for evacuation with use. The recommended MEDEVAC capability (comprising medical equipment and medical personnel commensurate to the patient’s needs) is not available leading to a lack of continuity in the medical care.

The Role 3 MTF for ENFM personnel is assured by hospitals in Catania (Italy, 45 Km distance from FLB Augusta and 22 Km from FOB Sigonella), Msida (Malta, 2 Km far from the port) and Heraklion (Greece, 132 Km far from FLS Souda).

Discussions on agreements for Role 3 MTF support both in Tunis (Tunisia) and Alexandria (Egypt) are ongoing. The signature of the agreement with Tunisia, already authorised at PSC level, and formally approved for financial aspects in the ATHENA Committee, is now waiting for a final check of language used in the arrangement (EEAS/CMPD with EUDEL Tunis are in the lead). Meanwhile, the agreement with Egypt is still in an evaluation phase.

Medical support for OHQ personnel is provided by Role 1 MTF at the infirmary of the Centrocelle Base and the Role 3 by Celio Military Hospital in Rome in accordance with a Technical Agreement with the Italian Ministry of Defence.
OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

Cooperation within EU and with International Organisations

Alongside the operational and tactical achievements, Key Leader Engagement and Outreach Activities form a major part of the day to day business of ENFM. During the reporting period, the Operation Commander and other senior members of ENFM have continued to focus on engaging relevant military and civil international actors. Engagement with justice and law enforcement authorities have been a priority, with ENFM conducting meetings with EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL, EUROPOL and the International Criminal Court (ICC) throughout the period. Further to the submission of the note verbale submitted to US authorities on behalf of ENFM in May, the Operation Commander met with senior officials in the US Departments of State and Defense in September. The Operation Commander also conducted strategic engagement with African Union officials during a visit to Addis Ababa, where follow up steps were agreed to in terms of information sharing and further engagement, and with Libyan political and military authorities in Tripoli as part of an EU delegation in October.

Exploratory meetings took place in Tunis with the Tunisian military leadership on areas of possible cooperation. In addition to the agreement to use Role 3 medical facilities in Tunisia that is almost ready to be signed, ENFM will continue to engage the Tunisian Navy in further discussions on the exchange of classified information with Tunisia, joint exercises and participation in LNCG training. MS will be kept updated on the issue and any step forward will be submitted in advance for MS approval.

Meetings were also conducted with EUDEL Libya, UNSMIL, UNHCR Libya, the International Maritime Organization, the International Chamber of Shipping and with representatives of EU Member States. These efforts have resulted in an increased international and regional understanding and acceptance of the operation and supported information exchange related to migration, training and operational matters.

In the reporting period, technical arrangements have been signed the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (27 June), the Italian Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterroismo (4 July), INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) Rome (21 July) and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (7 September). The document signed with the OSCE Special Representative will allow the participation of ENFM personnel in the workshops and training activities organized by OSCE. The Protocol signed with the Italian Anti-mafia Directorate set up the “First European Observatory on human traffickers and migrant smugglers”. Finally, the arrangements with INTERPOL NCB Rome and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor allow the Operation to enhance the vetting of LNCG training candidates.

Shared Awareness and De-confliction in the Mediterranean (SHADE MED)

The fourth SHADE MED forum was held in Rome on 8-9 June 2017. With 188 participants from 37 countries and 98 organisations, the event brought together a range of actors with an interest in irregular migration and maritime security in the Mediterranean. High-level key note speakers from EEAS, EUROPOL and INTERPOL focused on the need for effective
cooperation. There were operational updates from ENFM, the Italian Operation MARE SICURO, NATO, the Italian MRCC and FRONTEX. Following discussions between ENFM and the ICC, the recognition of migrant smuggling and human trafficking as a crime against humanity was discussed at the legal working group. Other working groups covered the smugglers’ business model, capacity building, communications and migration/SAR. As a result a paper on “Migrant Smuggling/Human Trafficking as a Crime against humanity” was issued at the end of the event.

This reporting period also saw the 5th SHADE Med Forum, which was hosted by the Italian Navy in Rome on 23-24 November 2017 with the support of the OHQ. The event attracted over 200 attendees from 36 countries and 94 international organisations. The central theme of the conference was “situational awareness, information exchange and capacity building”. The six working groups covered themes across “Info Exchange”, “Smuggling Business Model”, “Communication System Information Exchange”, “Training Libyan Navy Cost Guard”, “Migration & SAR” and “Capacity Building”. One of the outcomes of the forum was the drafting of guidance on the voluntary exchange of information between ENFM and ships operating in the Central Mediterranean Sea, and a paper supporting the establishing international controls on the export of inflatable boats and outboard motors to Libya.

First European Observatory on Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking

On 25 May, OPCDR signed an agreement with the Italian National Prosecutor at the DNAA headquarters in Rome, which launched a structured programme of activity under the title of the “First European Observatory on Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking”. The aim of the project, in accordance with the spirit of enhancing information sharing with law enforcement agencies, is to support the sharing of data and information in a structured manner between organisations already involved in addressing migrant smuggling and human trafficking related issues. The Operation intends to involve EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL, the UN Office for Drugs and Crime and the ICC alongside national level bodies, such as the Italian Ministry of the Interior and the Italian Coastguard.

The project will seek to draw together the contributors of expertise and knowledge, before publishing the first findings before the end of 2017. Furthermore, it will also entail the possibility to acquire useful data that will contribute to the understanding of the criminal phenomenon.

Gender related issues

In line with UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security and EU policy, ENFM continued to implement a gender-sensitive approach and cultural awareness in the reporting period. Gender mainstreaming remained an integral part of the induction training organised for all new units joining the mission. In addition to understanding EU policy,
attendees are also given specific training about sexual exploitation and abuse and how this can affect those migrants they might encounter at sea. Among the people rescued at sea, women and children are the most vulnerable and ENFM personnel are trained to be vigilant for signs of abuse and coercion as well as for indicators of trafficking. Gender mainstreaming also continues to be part of the training programme for the LNCG. The training aims to facilitate the understanding of basic gender concepts and help to shape how they respond effectively to women they encounter at sea.

Particular attention has also being paid in the Specialist Staff manning, recently reviewed to offer a more tailored and effective response to the issue (along with one gender advisor and one cultural and religious advisor, one further gender advisor has been recruited with specific expertise on migrants, smugglers and traffickers).

**KEY CHALLENGES**

The positive results that ENFM has achieved in contributing to disrupt the smugglers' business model during more than two years of activity on the high seas suggest that the Operation could be even more effective in Libyan territorial waters, where smugglers usually find refuge. In this regard, as is well known, a solution to the “legal finish” issue must be found and Libyan as well as international authorisations need to be obtained.

Supporting tasks related to countering illicit arms and oil smuggling activities are “intelligence driven” tasks that need to be supported with actionable intelligence by the EU and the Member States. Meanwhile, exchange of information with EUROPOL, FRONTEX and other judicial and law enforcement agencies at EU and international level needs to continue at the right pace and with the right level of attention. The pilot project on the “Crime Information Cell” should enhance the exchange of information, in particular with law enforcement agencies.

As regards logistic support for the arms embargo, a solution should be found for covering costs related to port fees and to the storage and destruction of weapons and ammunition.

The current legal framework does not allow any immediate or direct action to counter illicit oil smuggling. Nevertheless, this activity seems to grow in relevance and its negative effects are evident not only in Libya and its economy, but also in the destination ports. Further considerations could be made to evaluating the possible benefits of an active contribution of ENFM in fighting this illicit activity. From the operational point of view, the present CJSOR should allow the execution of a new task, if so decided by MS.

Training the LNCG is an integral part of the EU capacity building activities. It is now necessary to move from an “urgency to act” phase to a more structured approach where Libyan needs are analysed in a more comprehensive and systematic manner. In this regard, along with Brussels-based meetings among stakeholders, the Operation intends to organise more focused meetings to better synchronise the training task with other capacity
building initiatives, in particular those related to the establishment of a Libyan MRCC and equipping the Libyan Coastguard.

Moreover, the existing MoU is open to the legitimate Libyan Navy and Coastguard forces. When political and security conditions allow, the training could be used as an operational tool to ease the integration process between the different sectors of the Libyan Coastguard including the Eastern part. This would require a careful assessment and Member States’ authorisation.

The monitoring task is now essential for a proper assessment of Libyan Coastguard behaviour and capacity to fulfil their institutional tasks. To have a complete and clear picture, taking into account that around 50% of the trained personnel work ashore, a more continuous presence ashore in their Operations Room is crucial.

A constant force flow generation remains mandatory to achieve timely and effective results. In particular, assets such as a Flagship, UAVs and a ROLE 2 platform remain top priority needs. An operational assessment at the end of 240 flight hours of the UAV assets (scheduled at the end of February 2018) will be provided to the Member States for their further decision on common funding UAV assets (the requirement is assessed, for the time being, in 120 hours/month).

ENFM faces frequent personnel rotations that make carrying out the activities more difficult. Therefore longer tour lengths, of at least 6 months, and even longer for key positions such as ACOS and specialists, would greatly benefit the Operation.

**CONCLUSIONS**

ENFM has firmly established itself as a maritime security provider that, through the ability of its warships to contrast illicit activities in a timely and effective manner, acts as a deterrent against a wide range of threats in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and has a readiness to intervene in SOLAS events (still numerous in the area) whenever necessary.

The support provided to the Libyan Coastguard and Navy through the training delivered by ENFM, alongside Member States’ bilateral initiatives (in particular those aimed at providing assets and equipment for the Libyan Coastguard) have increased the Libyan operational activity at sea and improved their capacity to fulfil their institutional mandate. The Libyan Coastguard and Navy have also contributed to the decrease in the number of deaths in Libyan territorial waters.

The first results of training and the excellent relationship that has been built during two years of cooperation with the Libyan Coastguard and Navy confirm the decision of Member States to work with the Libyan authorities. However, achieving a more consistent Libyan capacity to fight illicit activities at sea requires time and patience as ENFM continues to build on the positive results already achieved.

As part of the EU’s capacity building efforts, monitoring is a key complement to training. As recent events at sea have demonstrated, the information gathered by the Libyan
Coastguard and the ongoing remote monitoring are not sufficient to build-up a consistent report. Considering that relevant decisions are taken in the Operations Room ashore where around 50% of trainees work, it is evident that without a more continuous presence ashore it will not be possible to achieve consistent results.

After two years of intensive efforts, the exchange of information between the Operation and other EU, UN and international actors, in particular law enforcement and judicial agencies, is providing positive results. ENFM will continue to invest resources in this field, and the recent initiative taken at political level to set-up a pilot project on the Crime Information Cell supports the Operation’s overall efforts to this end. Additionally, the outreach activities carried out by the OPCDR and key ENMF personnel remain an essential key enabler for the Operation.

ENFM has been acknowledged as a successful CSDP operation that is, along with other EU instruments, delivering positive effects in contributing to stabilise Libya through disrupting illicit activities at sea. The EU and the Member States should therefore continue to carefully shape a common narrative in line with the ENFM Information Communication Strategy, in order to build on the positive results achieved so far.